Inside the black box: unravelling the development viability

appraisal process by McAllister, Patrick et al.
Real Estate  & Planning 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Working Papers in Real Estate & Planning 12/13  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The copyright of each Working Paper remains with the author.  
If you wish to quote from or cite any Paper please contact the appropriate author.  
In some cases a more recent version of the paper may have been published elsewhere.  
 1 
 
 
Inside the Black Box: Unravelling the Development Viability 
Appraisal Process 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Patrick  McAllister1,  Emma  Street2  and  Peter  Wyatt2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1  University  College  London,  Bartlett  School  of  Planning,  Wates  House,  22  Gordon  Street,  London,  WC1H  
0QB,  UK 
2  University  of  Reading,  School  of  Real  Estate  and  Planning,  Henley  Business  School,  Reading  ,  RG6  
6AW,  UK,   
 
  
 2 
Inside the Black Box: Unravelling the Development Viability 
Appraisal Process 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
Over the last decade issues related to the financial viability of development have become increasingly 
important to the English planning system. As part of a wider shift towards the compartmentalisation 
of planning tasks, expert consultants are required to quantify, in an attempt to rationalise, planning 
decisions in terms of economic ‘viability’.  Often with a particular focus on planning obligations, the 
results of development viability modelling have emerged as a key part of the evidence base used in 
site-specific negotiations and in planning policy formation.  Focussing on the role of clients and other 
stakeholders, this paper investigates how development viability is tested in practice.  It draws together 
literature on the role of calculative practices in policy formation, client feedback and influence in real 
estate appraisals and stakeholder engagement and consultation in the planning literature to critically 
evaluate the role of clients and other interest groups in influencing the production and use of 
development viability appraisal models.  The paper draws upon semi-structured interviews with the 
main producers of development viability appraisals to conclude that, whilst appraisals have the 
potential to be biased by client and stakeholder interests, there are important controlling influences on 
potential opportunistic behaviour. One such control is local authorities’   weak understanding of 
development viability appraisal techniques which limits their capacity to question the outputs of 
appraisal models. However, this also is of concern given that viability is now a central feature of the 
town planning system. 
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Introduction 
 
Dating back to the 1947 Town and Country Planning Act, various policies have been introduced that 
attempt to capture some (and initially all) of the uplift in land value that accrues to the landowner 
when planning permission is granted.  The current incarnation of land value capture is a policy mix 
that allows local authorities to secure planning obligations and infrastructure levies.   However, policy 
now dictates that targets for affordable housing, community services and infrastructure payments must 
be set at levels that do not compromise the financially viability of proposed developments.  Whilst 
this might seem like a reasonable test, in practice its operation has proved problematic. The practice 
of development viability appraisal (DVA) centres on the calculation of land value using one of a 
number of standardised, industry-developed models. These models, in seeking to quantify complex 
(and often contested) information, provide an impression of technocratic rationality (see McAllister et 
al, 2013). 
 
DVA can be seen as a form of calculative practice that has become increasingly embedded in the 
English planning system in recent years (McAllister et al, 2013). The apparently value neutral process 
of quantification can be associated with a tendency for unquestioning, institutionalised trust in 
numbers which permits essentially political processes to be presented as technical procedures by 
reconfiguring subjective and contestable judgements as pseudo-scientific (Mennicken et al, 2008).  It 
has been argued that, in terms of their current application to planning, such calculative procedures are 
fundamentally flawed since they estimate whether policies to be implemented in the future on actual 
sites are viable at present for hypothetical sites (McAllister, et al. 2013).  In addition, and perhaps not 
surprisingly, the assumed return to the landowner has been a highly contested issue in terms of the 
DVA assumptions.   
 
Policy formation regarding planning obligations presents planners with ‘wicked’   problems  without  
value free, true-false solutions (Wilson, 2013).  Indeed, in mediating between competing and/or 
conflicting interests, planning perspectives on development tend to involve different 
conceptualizations   of   the   overarching   ‘problem’ (i.e. the appropriate balance between individual 
property rights and responsibilities to the community), and the appropriate distribution of wealth 
between private individuals, the state and the community.  As noted above, at the core of the wicked 
problem in the context of planning obligations is the distribution of the financial gains from planning 
permission between the community, developers and landowners.  The application of financial 
viability modelling techniques can be interpreted as an attempt to solve this problem using a rational, 
technocratic and quantitative method.       
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The widespread use of financial viability modelling can be analysed within the broader framework of 
‘the  politics  of  quantification’  and  a   longer   term  ‘quantitative   turn’   towards  framing   the  analysis  of  
socio-economic issues in arithmetical terms (see Simmel, 1997; Sangolt, 2010).  In the voluminous 
literature of the new economic sociology there is a duality in analyses of the performativity of 
calculative practices with advantages and disadvantages posited.  Exploring some of these conflicting 
interests for a moment, some see the benefits of quantification as its ability to reduce complexity, to 
incorporate diverse values and interests, and to offer a common language for negotiation thus 
providing a framework for conflict resolution.  In his seminal work Trust in Numbers,  Porter’s  (1998)  
central point is that quantification, by making differences of opinion more public and open to 
evaluation by similar standards, enables the production of trust.  In the case of financial feasibility 
modelling of development, below we present evidence to suggest that this type of analysis has some 
plausibility.   
 
As Christophers (2013) demonstrates, the origins of the application of financial viability modelling in 
the English planning system can be traced back to  the  testing  of  developers’  objections  to  perceived  
high affordable housing targets proposed by the Mayor of London.  Furthermore, it is difficult to 
argue against the proposition that the need to model the financial viability of area-wide planning 
policy and site-specific development proposals has forced local authorities, developers and 
landowners to be more transparent in their decision-making and negotiation processes, albeit 
developers  have  often  been  resistant  to  disclosing  ‘sensitive’  information.  However, Fligstein (1998) 
suggests that such an analysis is only partial.  He argues that the development of quantification reflects 
the relative power of stakeholders and is deeply embedded in political and economic arrangements 
that dictate how and under what conditions quantification is used.    
 
Whilst quantification may provide the impression of precision, objectivity and mechanical decision-
making, numbers are necessarily socially constructed.  A contrast is often drawn between 
technocratic, rational, expert-led decisions and politically-led and perhaps less rational decisions.  
Denis et al (2009) argue that this dichotomy between rationalism/quantification and politics is false.  
Quantification  can  facilitate  the  exercise  of  power  so  that  “strategists  armed  with  numbers  can  exert  
power.  Numbers  make  things  governable…”,  promote  control  and  legitimacy  by  providing power and 
authority to act that may be particularly valuable in pluralistic organizations  (Denis et al, 2006, 350).   
 
In the organisational decision-making literature, studies have demonstrated that rational decision 
procedures can be used to legitimise predetermined preferences and to support a case (see Meyer, 
1984 and Lindblom and Cohen, 1979).  In the context of development viability modelling, McAllister 
et al (2013) argue that these issues are crystallized in the intense debate about the assumptions that 
should be used to establish an appropriate or competitive return to the landowner when modelling 
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viability.  They suggest that it is in this specific, highly contested modelling assumption about the 
distribution of the financial gains from a development that the competing interests of the community 
and landowner is most apparent and the façade of technocratic rationality is most apparent. 
 
In this paper, the focus is on the roles of clients and other stakeholders in the process by which DVAs 
are produced.  We draw upon two strands of literature to investigate potential sources of bias in the 
production of DVAs.  Given that a DVA is essentially a category of real estate appraisal, the first area 
relates to the potential for clients to bias independent real estate appraisals in order to serve their own 
interests.  Related to the application of such appraisal techniques in the planning system, the second 
strand refers to the role of consultation and participation in planning policy formation processes. 
 
An essentially conventional real estate appraisal technique, with all its recognised shortcomings, is 
now at the heart of a wider participatory/consultative planning process and so the aim of this paper is 
to bring the real estate literature on client influence and appraisal bias into conversation with the 
planning participation literature. In the next section we review literature on real estate appraisal that 
deals with the issues of client influence and potential bias on the DVA process.  This is followed by a 
linked review of collaborative planning literature which has discussed at length the (dis)benefits of 
engaging a range of stakeholders in the development and planning process but has had little to say 
about this in relation to development viability.  We then draw together elements from these literatures 
to interpret data from a range of interviews conducted with those involved in the DVA process. The 
role of different stakeholders, including clients, consultants, local authority planners and community 
actors, and their level of input into the DVA process is assessed. The paper concludes by drawing 
together observations about potential sources of bias in DVAs before reflecting more broadly on the 
roles of stakeholders in decision-making around specific development sites and the formation of 
planning policy. 
 
Development Viability Appraisal in the Planning System 
 
In the academic literature, Campbell and Henneberry (2005) were probably the first to identify the 
introduction of financial modelling into planning practice.  In formal policy terms Circular 05/05 
proposed   the  need   for   ‘financial   information’   to   inform   the  process  of   setting  planning  obligations.    
Between 2008-2010 Planning Policy Statement 12: Local Spatial Planning and Planning Policy 
Statement 3: Housing and a series of planning appeals underpinned this shift.  The current UK 
coalition Government has also maintained this approach.  In 2012, the National Planning Policy 
Framework emphasised that local planning authorities  should  pay  “careful  attention  to  viability”.    It 
states that 
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“[T]o   ensure   viability,   the   costs   of   any   requirements….such   as   requirements   for   affordable  
housing,  standards,  infrastructure  provision  and  other  requirements  should…  provide  competitive  
returns  to  a  willing  landowner  and  a  willing  developer  to  enable  development  to  be  deliverable”  
(DCLG, 2012, 41) 
 
Viability is assessed using a relatively straightforward financial appraisal model: a development 
scheme is considered viable if the projected revenues from a development scheme are sufficient to 
justify incurring the costs of development.  Development costs typically include:  
 
1. A financial return to the landowner that is sufficient to incentivise sale of the land;  
2. Costs associated with the development scheme (site preparation, construction, professional 
fees, stamp duty, marketing and leasing, etc.);  
3. A financial return to the developer sufficient to incentivise undertaking the development; and    
4. Planning obligations including the Community Infrastructure Levy. 
Embodying these core principles, guidance from the Royal Institution of Chartered Surveyors defines 
financial viability for the purposes of town planning decisions as: 
 
“An   objective   financial   viability   test   of the ability of a development project to meet its costs 
including the cost of planning obligations, whilst ensuring an appropriate site value for the 
landowner  and  a  market   risk   adjusted   return   to   the  developer   in  delivering   that  project.” (RICS, 
2012) 
 
While financial viability modelling is obviously key to the development process in general, and to 
developers and their financiers in particular, it has become a central feature of the town planning 
system comparatively recently.  Scheme viability is a now a material consideration in determining 
levels of developer contribution via mechanisms such as s106 of the Town and Country Planning Act 
1990 and the Community Infrastructure Levy.  This places a responsibility on local planning 
authorities to understand viability issues in the context of site-specific development planning 
decisions as well as area-wide planning policy.   
 
Viability is assessed using a financial appraisal method that has long been criticised by the various 
professions that have had to use it (Coleman et al. 2012).  Conventionally the method has been used 
to value individual development sites so the inputs relate to the particular circumstances of a scheme, 
so-called   ‘site-specific   DVAs’.      This   is   important   because   site-specific costs, often referred to as 
abnormal costs, can constitute a significant proportion of the development costs. This is particularly 
so in the case of complicated brownfield sites with existing buildings to remove, neighbouring 
buildings close-by, potential contamination, fragmented land ownership and so on.  The use of DVAs 
as an evidence base for planning policy formation requires extrapolation from this snapshot or site-
specific appraisal, to an area-wide (local authority district, for example) appraisal. These have a 
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potential shelf life of five to ten years or more (the life of a typical local plan).  Area-wide DVAs 
typically consist of a test of whether potential policies regarding planning obligations and CIL and site 
allocation are deliverable.  Our focus in this paper is solely on these area-wide DVAs. The highly 
contested issues surrounding site-specific appraisals are the focus of a forthcoming paper. 
 
Drawing on previous work on the methods, techniques and assumptions used in DVAs, McAllister 
and Wyatt (2013) identify five limitations of, and problems with, the current approach to DVA for 
policy formation.  The criticisms centre on whether models are technically robust, appropriate for 
purpose and, entering the realm of value judgement, equitable1.  
 
1. Whilst landowners, developers and government generally accept the calculative principles 
underpinning DVAs, there are a number of simplifications or assumptions used in some 
variations of the models that are considered to lack robustness from the perspective of 
corporate finance theory.     
 
2. DVAs have become central to policy setting and negotiations over the distribution between 
landowner and community of financial gains generated by planning permission, but the 
appraisal model itself distils to a single focal point; setting an appropriate return to the 
landowner.  This remains a contested and as yet unresolved issue and current guidance is 
variable and ambiguous.    
 
3. As noted above, DVA models applied on an area-wide basis are effectively estimating 
whether future planning policy targets for planning obligations, affordable housing and 
community infrastructure are currently viable.   
 
4. Due to variations in development costs and values, there can be significant local variations in 
the capacities of sites to support planning obligations and infrastructure payments.  Fixing a 
standard tariff across a wide geographical area can mean that marginally viable sites are not 
brought forward and extremely viable sites do not yield high levels of planning gains for the 
community.  In fiscal terms, if we interpret planning obligations and infrastructure payments 
as a quasi-hypothecated tax, the current system is regressive.  Due to differences in the 
earning capacities of sites over time and space, fixed levies or tariffs mean that different 
developers/land owners may pay similar amounts of  ‘tax’  but  very  different  rates. It is likely 
that  sites  generating  the  lowest  level  of  value  uplift  will  incur  the  highest  rates  of  ‘tax’.                                                              
1 A much more detailed discussion of these issues can be found in Crosby, Wyatt and McAllister (2012), McAllister, Wyatt and Coleman 
(2013) and Coleman, Crosby, McAllister and Wyatt (2012).   
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5. The  current  system  ‘taxes’  expected  income  in  advance  of  earnings.    In  addition,  the  amount  
paid often bears little relation to the externalities generated by a development.  Further, given 
that the scope for planning obligations from sites is broadly linked to economic vitality, the 
current system tends to reinforce existing spatial inequalities.   
 
Much of the literature on DVA to date focuses on modelling techniques and information inputs; there 
has been little consideration of the DVA production process, that is, how models are produced, by 
whom, and how they are used to inform decision-making?  This lack of research, which at least partly 
stems from the relatively recent integration of DVA into the town planning system, is of concern for 
two main reasons. First, the level of importance being placed on DVAs by the current government 
through national planning policy is increasing. Some see this as part of the rise of neo-liberalism with 
its ‘emphasis on the market as the key indicator of individual and, in an aggregated form, societal 
preference’   (Campbell   and  Marshall,   2006:   240).  The emphasis now placed by the town planning 
system on quantifying the costs of and revenue from development has increased as a result of 
government intervention in the housing market with the result that local planning authorities are being 
encouraged to renegotiate extant but unimplemented planning permissions to determine whether 
planning obligations are stalling development (DCLG, 2012).  
 
One consequence is that models increasingly confront people without the requisite quantitative or 
modelling backgrounds but who are nonetheless tasked with reaching an informed and unbiased 
decision based, in part, on the outputs of these models (Jakeman et al: 2006). While some DVAs are 
conducted in-house at local authorities, resource constraints, compounded by a lack of financial 
modelling expertise, mean that expert input from professional development viability consultants is 
usually required to inform decision-making. This can be seen as part of a wider shift whereby 
planning is carved up into a series of discrete or  ‘particular’  tasks including the production of DVAs, 
Environmental Impact Assessments, and statements of Community Involvement (amongst others), 
requiring a series of technical inputs from specialists (see Campbell and Marshall, 2006; Gunn and 
Vigar, 2012; Raco et al, 2013). What this ‘expert’ input is, how independent it is, and how it informs 
client (local planning authority) decision-making, are matters of interest to this paper. 
 
Second, despite increased reliance on DVAs, the relationships between stakeholders engaged in, and 
affected by, viability appraisals remain poorly understood. While the imperative to consult a range of 
actors in reaching planning decisions (at the policy and site-specific level) is now embedded within 
the planning system, the arrangements that underpin DVAs are largely unknown outside of the 
industry. As such, despite professional requirements that require the recording of meeting minutes 
(see following section), ensuring appraisals are conducted in a transparent, fair and ethical manner is 
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left in the hands of the actors involved, including private consultants working on a for-profit basis, to 
self-regulate. Questions that arise include: which stakeholders are (not) involved in DVAs, what are 
their respective roles, how do these roles then exert influence over decision-making, and what is the 
potential for bias?  
 
Client Influence in Real Estate Appraisals 
 
Over the last decade, as the concept of viability has become more central to policy formulation and, in 
particular, to the delivery of affordable housing through s106 agreements, DVAs have become a 
standard offering from various private sector organisations. In most mature real estate markets, 
commercial real estate appraisals are typically regulated by a blend of governmental legislation and 
professional institutions. In the UK, the Royal Institution of Chartered Surveyors (RICS) produces 
guidance on professional standards and is one of the organisations that have been drafting guidance on 
the production of DVAs for planning purposes.  The RICS (2012a) states that an appraiser must act 
independently and objectively.  The appraisal standards also identify the particular threat to 
objectivity of communication with a client or another party before a valuation report is produced:   
 
“A  threat  to  the  valuer’s  objectivity  can  arise  where  the  outcome  of  a  valuation  is  discussed  before  
its completion with either the client or another party with an interest in the valuation. While such 
discussions are not improper, and indeed may be beneficial to both the valuer and the client, the 
valuer must be alert to the potential influence that such discussions may have on his or her 
fundamental  duty  to  provide  an  objective  opinion”  (RICS,  2012a, VS 1.7, para 7) 
 
Following potential problems of client influence in appraisals identified in the UK through academic 
research (a summary of which follows), professional regulatory requirements to record meetings on 
‘drafts’   appraisals  were   introduced   (see   Baum et al, 2000). This guidance supported the notion of 
beneficial client influence and endorsed the practice of meetings between client and appraiser during 
the appraisal production process (RICS, 2002, p22).  
 
In the real estate literature, there is a fairly well established body of work on client influence in real 
estate appraisals. Crosby et al (2010) argue that clients often have the means, motives and 
opportunities to influence real estate appraisals. Their motives tend to be economic, for example to 
enhance apparent investment performance. The opportunity to influence is provided by the typically 
high level of consultation with clients on appraisals. The means are provided by the intrinsic 
uncertainty in appraisal models together with expertise of some clients in this area. The literature has 
also identified different types of influence (coercive, covert, reward, information) on different 
categories of appraisal (e.g. for brokerage or investment performance measurement) at different stages 
of the process (instruction, information collection, calculation, reporting, etc.) as shown in Table 1.  
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The table provides a summary of the typical stages of a DVA process in its role in providing an 
evidence base for area-wide planning policy formation, along with the respective actors involved. 
 
Table 1 – The Area-Wide Development Viability Appraisal Process 
Stage Instruction, 
tender process, 
contract 
negotiation 
Information 
collection  
and consultation 
Processing and 
calculation 
Draft reporting & 
feedback 
Hand-over 
Involve-
ment 
Local authority, 
consultants 
Local authority, 
consultant, 
stakeholders 
Consultants, 
market advisors 
Local authority, 
councillors, 
consultants 
Local authority, 
consultants 
 
The majority of studies used quasi-experimental (see Hansz, 2004; Amidu and Aluko, 2007; Amidu, 
Aluko and Hansz, 2008), interview (see McAllister et al, 2004; Crosby et al 2004 and Levy and 
Schuck, 2005) and postal survey-based (see Smolen and Hambleton, 1997; Kinnard et al, 1997; 
Gallimore and Wolverton, 2000; Yu, 2002) approaches. A stylized fact that emerges from this body of 
work is that clients sometimes attempt to influence appraisal outcomes and that appraisals are likely to 
respond to client pressure.  McAllister et al (2004) in particular identified that there could also be 
quality assurance benefits from client feedback. Clients can assist by providing information about the 
properties or the market that the appraiser may be unaware of.  Clients may also monitor the appraiser 
to ensure that sufficient effort is being applied.  It is also common for expert clients to check 
appraisals for errors or omissions.   
 
Obviously this type of behaviour is not unique to real estate appraisers.  There is a large body of 
research on information intermediaries (auditors, ratings agencies, equity analysts inter alia) 
indicating that their advice and analyses are not always independent.  For equity analysts, it has been 
found   that  analysts’   recommendations   can  be systematically  biased  by   their  organisation’s  business  
relationship with companies being analysed (see Lin and McNichols, 1998; Michaely and Womack, 
1999; Malmendier and Shantikumar, 2005). More notoriously, a range of explanations for the poor 
performance  of  the  rating  agencies  include  “rating  shopping”;;  the  role  of  competition  and  pursuit  of  
market share; and employment impacts of the close relationship between rating agencies and issuers 
(see Benmelech and Dlugosh 2009a, 2009b and Ashcraft et al, 2010).  In the auditing literature, 
problems  can  occur  where  there  is  “mutuality  of  interests”  between  auditor  and  client,  due  mainly to 
incentives created by auditor economic dependence and/or the provision of non-auditing services by 
the auditing firm (see Zhang, 1999; Windsor and Ashkansay, 1995; Zimbelman and Waller, 1999).  
However, studies have also found evidence of counterincentives to mitigate the potential agency costs 
associated with economic dependence.  Reynolds and Francis (2000) and Gaver and Paterson (2007) 
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found that, consistent with potential large costs of lawsuits, the Big Five US audit firms tend to be 
more conservative in auditing larger firms.      
 
Drawing   upon  Trevino’s   (1986)   interactionist  model   of   ethical   organisational   decision-making, the 
extent of negative client influence can be analysed as a product of the balance of internal and external 
variables on both clients and appraisals.  For clients, the salience of the appraisal is the key situational 
factor creating the incentives to influence it.  The incentives for the individual appraiser to respond to 
pressure from clients to deviate from their independent estimates of value are also contingent on the 
relative costs and benefits of yielding to client pressure.  Situational drivers, such as economic 
dependence, are refracted through clients and appraisers. Internal or dispositional factors then become 
determinants of the outcome of any appraisal consultation process.   In the auditing literature the main 
focus has been on variations in the level of moral reasoning among individuals (see Trevino, 1986). 
Windsor and Ashkansay (1995) identify three categories of individual – autonomous, pragmatic and 
accommodating – that tend to respond in different ways to client pressure.  Individual behaviour will 
also be affected by the organizational culture in which they operate (see Schein, 1985).  Furthermore, 
individuals and firms exist within a wider business culture and it is generally acknowledged that 
different markets and cultures have different rules and expectations regarding ethical behaviour from 
market participants (Ahmed, Chung and Eichenseher, 2003). 
 
The Rules of (Stakeholder) Engagement 
 
The client influence literature, which highlights the role that (unregulated) activities such as 
stakeholder behaviour, organizational culture and institutional practices exert over the appraisal 
process, challenges the way in which DVA has often been presented. Typically, and particularly in 
guidance issued by government or professional bodies, DVA is characterised as a wholly technical or 
value-neutral process of quantification. The effect of this is to obfuscate the political nature of the 
issues, assumptions and contested (human) decision-making processes that it is embedded within and 
constituted through (Mennicken et al, 2008; see also Swyngedouw, 2006). While there has been little 
discussion of these issues in relation to DVA specifically (although see McAllister et al, 2013, 
Christopher, 2013), there is consensus within the planning theory literature that development and 
planning should be conceptualised as inherently political matters (see Campbell and Marshall, 2004, 
Flyvbjerg, 1998, Hillier, 2000).  
 
It is our intention to bring these more established, and small and emerging, literatures into 
conversation to challenge representations of DVA as largely technical and value-free exercise in 
quantification. Much of the work conducted thus far, and which we build upon in this paper, has 
identified the difficulty in reconciling what, ostensibly, is a straightforward process of quantification 
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involving the input of ‘hard’  market data, with the ‘soft’ involvement of (and responsibility towards) a 
range of stakeholders, some of whom may have a vested interest in skewing model outputs. In the 
following section, we turn towards the wider planning literature to consider the reasons for engaging 
different stakeholder interests in DVA (understood as part of the inherently political process of 
planning and development), and compare and contrast this with the literature from a modelling 
perspective.  
 
In recent years, a large literature has emerged that draws attention to the (conflicting) interests that 
occupy the terrain of planning and development (see, for example, Brindley et al, 2005; Campbell and 
Marshall, 2004; Flyvbjerg, 1998; Healey, 1992; Hillier, 2000). A central concern of this body of 
research is to highlight the destabilising effect particular interest groups can have upon equitable 
outcomes in planning and development decision-making, and to look for ways in which a fair balance 
between different stakeholder interests can be obtained to benefit the public interest (see Healey, 
1997; Koch, 2013). The planning literature primarily addresses the question of stakeholder 
engagement from the perspective of equity   and   justice.   Campbell   and   Marshall’s   (2004:   240)  
viewpoint is not an uncommon one:  
 
‘We regard planning as an activity which is concerned with making choices about good 
and bad, right and wrong, with and for others, in relation to particular places. It is about 
making ethical choices over issues which are often highly contested. Planning is 
therefore  profoundly  concerned  with  justice’.   
 
As recognition of the ways in which power relations constitute (and potentially facilitate the 
manipulation of) planning outcomes has grown (see Flyvbjerg, 1998), planning academics, drawing 
upon the ideas of therorists such as Jürgen Habermas, have paid attention to the ways in which 
interest groups are engaged in planning processes. A Habermasian conception of justice is predicated 
upon an  ‘ideal  speech  situation’  where  ‘rationally motivated argument’ or  ‘consensus’  can be attained 
(White, 1988: 55). In the planning context, this entails the creation of forums in which all stakeholders 
are (equally) able to participate  and   ‘where uncoerced deliberation leading to consensus can occur’ 
(Campbell and Marshall, 2004, p245). While epistemologically diverse, thinking on these matters has 
been brought together under the label of collaborative planning, a set of theoretical ideas and practical 
interventions designed to encourage more collaborative, inclusionary forms of planning practice, of 
which stakeholder participation is a key tenet (Healey, 1997).  
 
The motivations for increased stakeholder engagement in the development of the type of (ostensibly) 
quantitative models such as those at the heart of DVA tend to be somewhat different. While questions 
of justice and equity are not unimportant, the focus here is on developing   a   ‘broader and more 
balanced view of the management issue to  be  incorporated  in  the  model’,  as  well  as,  ‘improving the 
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adoption of results from the assessment [and] increasing the  likelihood  of  better  outcomes’  (Jakeman  
et al, 2006, p3). Engagement is seen as key in developing better models; offering an  ‘opportunity for 
stakeholders to learn about interactions in their system and likely consequences of their   decisions’  
(Jakeman et al, 2006: 3). Much like in the planning literature, the extent and depth of stakeholder 
participation is deemed important in developing robust modelling techniques. As Jakeman et al 
(2006) note, in the past this has often been rather tokenistic. However, increasingly, stakeholders are 
being engaged in model development in the early stages through collaborative arrangements that sees 
their feedback integrated and adopted.  Such good practice is particularly important where models are 
used   to   try   and  address   “wicked”  problems – so-called because they are ‘difficult   to  define,  multi-
faceted and infinitely malleable’ (Campbell and Marshall, 2006, p246). It is, of course, precisely these 
kinds of problems with which planners are routinely faced (see Beck, 2002; Koch, 2013; Wilson, 
2013). 
 
The last two sections have, together, drawn out a range of observations around (good) practice in 
stakeholder engagement. While the benefits associated with consulting different interest groups have 
been long been recognised in planning literature and practice, participation is increasingly seen as 
good practice in model development too. Consulting interested parties is, first and foremost, seen as 
way to produce more accurate and effective models by ensuring that accurate information and 
knowledge is incorporated into model design. This is particularly important in development appraisal 
as the availability of information is often patchy. As the client influence literature shows, stakeholder 
engagement in model-design and application also provides a way to reduce the opportunities for bias 
by increasing transparency around the assumptions that inform models, as well adding robustness to 
the decision-making practices based upon model outputs.  The following section draws upon 
interview data to assess the evidence that such (good) practices are occurring in the DVA process. 
 
Method and Data 
 
The empirical data presented in this section is drawn from an in-depth interview survey of producers 
of DVAs, providing grounded insights into the process that underpins their production.  A semi-
structured interview technique was chosen for data collection, based around the questions in 
Appendix 1. 11 interviews were conducted during the period September-November 2012. 
Professionally, respondents formed a group consisting of chartered surveyors, town planners and 
economists, with a mix of backgrounds covering valuation, commercial and residential development, 
consultancy, housing, master/strategic planning and research/academia.  All respondents bar one were 
senior  practitioners  (20+  years’  experience)  within  their  company  or  field  and  all  were  experienced  in  
the production of DVAs for local planning authority clients.   Three respondents in particular were 
involved with the early production and contribution to the formulation of approach for such studies, 
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particularly during the period 2001-2004, and several other respondents have actively contributed to 
professional and government committees that are involved with the provision of guidance in this area.   
The majority of respondents testified to a large influx of development viability work for local 
planning authorities during the period 2008-10.  Geographically, whilst the majority of respondents 
were based in the South East of England, between them they had produced the majority of the DVAs 
for planning policy formation across all regions of the country.  
 
In order to better understand who is involved in the DVA process, an industry analysis was carried out 
to identify the main groups of producers.  From this industry analysis, seven groups were identified; 
property consultants, planning consultants, multi-disciplinary engineering consultants, specialist 
providers, software  specialists  and  providers,  District  Valuer  Services  (Government’s  internal  valuers)  
and academic institutions. It should be noted that some large firms informally sub-contract to 
specialist consultants.  Large firms may also be quite fragmented with relatively small regional offices 
performing the appraisals.  In addition, individuals within organisations had diverse experience and 
some units within large firms (the multi-disciplinary civil engineering consultancies for example) 
were formed from recent takeovers of smaller specialist firms.    
 
Table 2 lists organisations offering DVA services as of July 2011.  This list was compiled from a 
search of DVAs that had been commissioned by local authorities in support of their policies for 
planning obligations.  The reports of these appraisals are publicly available on local authority 
websites.  The property services sector focuses on private sector clients and use DVAs to (re)negotiate 
planning obligations.  Planning consultancies offer DVAs to public and private sector clients.  
Consultancies vary in size and sector involvement with some being part of larger multi-disciplinary 
organisations such as RPS Group, while others concentrate on planning and economic development 
services. Some multi-disciplinary consultancies that historically have focused on services in the 
engineering sector have diversified across all built environment sectors and now offer planning and 
economic development services including DVAs.  The specialist consultancies can be broadly divided 
between those stemming from services related to housing and affordable housing and those stemming 
from planning policy and economics, with obvious overlaps.  Many of those offering DVA services 
use bespoke spreadsheet models.  Others have developed software that has become marketed 
commercially such as the Three Dragons Toolkit developed by Three Dragons and the Development 
Appraisal Tool developed by GVA for the Homes & Communities Agency. 
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Table 2 – DVA service providers 
Property services sector Alder King 
BNP Paribas Carter Jonas 
CBRE Cushman Wakefield 
DTZ GVA 
Jones Lang Lasalle Knight Frank 
Savills Turner Morum 
  
Planning consultancies Acorous 
Assetz Development Baker Associates (now part of Peter Brett Associates) 
Bespoke Property Group CgMS Consulting 
DHA Planning Dixon Searle Partnership 
Hunter Planning Consultants Roger Tym & Partners (now part of Peter Brett 
Associates) 
RPS Group Turley Associates 
LPP Developments (wholly owned subsidiary of The 
London Planning Practice) 
 
  
Multidisciplinary (engineering) consultancies  
Atkins Global Entec 
ERM Jacobs Engineering 
  
Specialist providers  
Arc4 Adams Integra 
Fordham Research Christopher Marsh & Co 
Joliffe and Flint Level 
Tribal Consulting Three Dragons 
District Valuer Services Providers of services to local authorities 
City of London Corporation (the only example found of a 
local authority undertaking its own DVA) 
University of the West of England 
 
In addition to developing understanding of who is involved in the production of DVAs, we also 
wanted  to  build  a  picture  of  what  their  respective  roles  are,  and  how  (or  if)  different  actors’  input  into  
the DVA process is regulated or codified. 
 
Findings 
 
Table 1 summarised the process by which area-wide DVAs are produced.  To recap, a local authority 
(usually the planning and/or housing department) draws up a brief for the work, an invitation to tender 
is issued, shortlisted bidders are interviewed and the successful bidder contracts to do the work. The 
nature of the work is such that specialist viability appraisers conduct the work on behalf of a client 
under contract. As mentioned above, these appraisers usually have a background in surveying. 
Following the completion of tendering, at the pre-contract stage there may be some negotiation over 
the scope of work such as the number and type of sites to be considered, the extent of any sensitivity 
analysis for policy variables such as affordable housing and other s106 costs for example.  Typically, 
once a contract has been signed, an inception meeting takes place.  It is worth noting here that the 
consultant oversees much of the DVA process with varying levels of input from the local authority 
client.  
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This raises questions about impartiality and, more specifically, the level of influence private 
consultants may exert over practices that now form a material part of planning decisions. For 
example, the consultant usually sets the agenda of the initial meeting, which is designed to establish 
the scope of the DVA in terms of stakeholder engagement, data gathering, modelling framework and 
assumptions.  At that point, the consultant takes the lead on the study, which typically takes four to 
eight weeks.  Towards the end of the process, the consultant issues a draft, and then final, report to the 
client.  None of the interviewees knew of a local authority that had done a viability appraisal in-house. 
This   reinforces   perceptions   of   local   authorities’   lack   of   ownership   of   the   process   and   supports   a  
framing of DVA as a   largely   ‘expert-led’   practice   that   takes   place   with   little   of   the  
governmental/regulatory oversight that might be expected given how contested the matter of 
establishing viability is. 
 
In the context of the particular focus of this paper, three broad procedural themes emerged from the 
interview data. These are: client knowledge and involvement, client influence, and modes of 
stakeholder engagement.  These themes are now discussed in turn and linked to the foregoing 
literature reviews to draw out a range of reflective critical observations about the operation of the 
DVA process. 
 
Client (local authority) knowledge and involvement 
 
As we have already noted in the paper, in a context whereby planning tasks are increasingly broken 
up into a range of tasks requiring specialist input, consultants are appointed for their expertise in and 
experience of area-wide DVA. This raises a number of questions, not least; how informed is the client 
with regard to, not only the process of delivering a DVA report, but its content, assumptions, evidence 
base and so on?  Is the local authority, for example, expecting to take the report and be able to explain 
it to councillors, to defend it at an examination in public, or is the authority expecting the consultant 
to do this on its behalf?  This relates back to a point made earlier in the paper; that financial viability 
has only become a consideration in development decision-making in planning relatively recently. This 
meant, as an interviewee observed, that local authorities need to put: 
 
…policies in place which they can defend from a whole range of perspectives including 
the  question  of  viability  and  they  hadn’t  had  to  do  that  until  early  2003/04.  
Respondent 01 
 
The same interviewee argued that having a robust viability appraisal system, capable of dealing with 
multiple interests in a transparent and fair way important since, “planning policies are contestable, 
that’s  the  nature  of  the  planning  system”  (Respondent 01).  This does not mean that planning should 
only about establishing financial viability, indeed far from it, as an interviewee was keen to point out:  
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Viability  appraisal  shouldn’t  be  a  bottom-drawer approach to planning.  It should be 
policy led, need  led”.   
Respondent 01 
 
Here the need to be transparent was considered crucial: 
 
if you have read any of our reports, it is clear that there is a very large section that sets 
out  in  no  uncertain  terms  what  we  do  and  what  we  don’t  do,  and  that’s  really  very 
important. 
Respondent 01 
  
The interviewee is pointing here to a need to ensure that local authorities are aware of the uncertainty 
of DVA outputs, and, moreover, reach a level of knowledge about the process (and model outputs) 
that enables them to query, question and, possibly, challenge the results. He was of the view that local 
authorities should learn from DVA consultants and take on such work themselves in the future rather 
than repeatedly appoint consultants to provide updates, something that can be both costly, and 
potentially  exacerbate  existing  knowledge  gaps  that  undermines  local  authorities’  ability  to  question  
model outputs. However, the interviewee noted this his was not a viewpoint shared by other 
consultants who are likely to be protective of their status as expert service providers in order to help 
secure future income streams.   
 
Our data suggest that the message about needing to be better informed about DVA might be getting 
through to local authorities. As another interviewee commented, some clients had started to ask 
appraisers to:  
 
…leave with them some sort of tool-kit and train them up on that tool-kit such that they 
might be able to use it in the future as an update”.   
Respondent 06 
 
This served an important secondary function, namely that it provided a tool for local authorities to use 
to scrutinize viability data provided by developers. As he explained:   
 
If a developer comes in with a viability issue on a site, then, in theory they would be able 
to use this tool-kit you have given them to do their own calculation as to whether or not 
there is a viability issue.  
Respondent 06 
 
This quote indicates that knowledge transfer is occurring, and exchange that may help to redress some 
of the gaps in client knowledge and ensure   that   the   ‘black-box’   of   DVA   becomes   more   open   to  
scrutiny, at least from some actors, in future. At present, however, when asked whether the client was 
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well informed on DVA matters, it was generally felt that local authorities were not particularly 
knowledgeable. A typical comment was: 
 
Some clearly  understand  what  they’re  looking  for,  others  don’t…They’re  not  necessarily  
experts  in  viability  and  don’t  necessarily  know  what  they  need  to  ask.  So  very  often  it  is  a  
question of guiding them as well in terms of what they actually need  
Respondent 10 
 
For some, this  lack  of  knowledge  was  worrying  and  meant  that  clients  could  be  “led by consultants 
far too much”.  A  more  disparaging,  but  not  isolated,  view  of  local  authorities  was  that:  “they  don’t  
have a clue, local  authorities  are  utterly  clueless” (Respondent 02). 
 
When quizzed as to why local authorities were inexperienced, several interviewees highlighted the 
relatively recent focus on viability matters in planning, as well as the tendency for planners to be less 
confident when dealing with the type of calculations embedded within DVA models. As one 
interviewee explained: 
 
Planners were being asked to do something that was actually very new to them therefore I 
can’t  really  blame  them  going  to  people,  ‘you’re  a valuer, you  can  do  it’  …  Planners  will  
be  the  first  people  to  say  they  don’t  understand  these  things  …On the whole they have 
great awareness of issues but they are not particularly numerate and they will be the first 
to admit that.  
Respondent 01 
 
For another interviewee, it was less about planners being unable to bring DVAs in-house, and more 
that they were unwilling to, preferring instead to: 
 
 …pay the (consultant) for information they already have; pay the consultant for a lot of 
time to go out and find out things they knew anyway, they can’t  be  (bothered)  to  collect  it. 
 Respondent 07 
  
This interviewee did not refer directly to the financial pressures being experienced by many planning 
authorities who, at the time of interview, were experiencing budget cuts as part of austerity policies.  
However, it seems plausible that, as well as being subject to heightened levels of scrutiny over 
spending decisions,  planning  authorities’  capacity  to  retain  (or  indeed  take  on  new)  tasks  in-house is 
becoming more limited as cutbacks are made. 
 
On the more general question of awareness of DVA issues, participants reported variable levels. In 
some cases authorities were:  
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…quite   savvy   on  what   is   required…They come at you with a specific requirement and 
they know exactly what they want. 
Respondent 03 
 
While in other instances: 
 
 ...they  are  doing   it  because   they  have   to  do   it  but   they  don’t   really  know  why   they  are  
doing it or what the output is going to be.  Respondent 03 
 
In this situation, the interviewee felt that it was about “educating  the  client” about what the process 
entailed.  The issue of geography came into play here, and some expressed the view that client 
awareness varied depending on location. Central London local authorities were perceived to be very 
well-informed while, in other parts of the country, and even in outer London, knowledge of DVA was 
not felt to be as strong. 
 
In summary, client knowledge of the DVA process is best described as patchy. Several interviewees 
acknowledged that there are individuals within the local authorities with expertise in particular 
aspects of the process such as housing.  The feeling was that, while gaps in knowledge remain an 
issue, over time local authorities have generally become both better informed about viability matters, 
as well as more realistic about their planning policy aspirations. As one interviewee put it:  
 
“They are becoming more  of  an  informed  client  whereas  five  years  ago  they  didn’t  really  
know what they were asking for.” 
Respondent 10 
 
This is important since, in a context of fiscal austerity, underperformance in key economic sectors 
such as construction (see ONS, 2013), and pro (sustainable) development planning policy, viability is 
likely to become a more prominent feature of the planning process. As this interviewee commented - 
“they  are  becoming  more  familiar  because  they’re  being  bombarded  with  it  all  the  time” (Respondent 
10).   New policy directives such as the Community Infrastructure Levy, which have viability matters 
at their core, underline the need for planners to become more au fait with DVA if they are to retain a 
meaningful stake in the process.  The planning literature suggests that this is important from a social 
justice perspective since, as those charged with balancing (conflicting) interests to reach decisions in 
the public interest, planners need to be informed about the issues at stake and how these might 
(dis)benefit certain stakeholders. From a modelling perspective, an informed client can provide 
valuable inputs to models such as local market knowledge, ultimately producing more accurate 
outcomes. This is an example of how client influence over DVA can be beneficial (see McAllister et 
al, 2004; RICS, 2012a). The issue of client influence is one to which we now turn our attention.  
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Client influence 
 
Clients’ general lack of expertise in DVA suggests that local authority clients would be unlikely to 
have the knowledge or possess the information needed to bias DVA outputs. At the instruction stage, 
interviewees suggested that it was almost universal practice for local authorities to put out such work 
to tender.  In the literature on valuation for loan purposes, there is clear evidence that client influence 
can often occur at the appointment stage.  For instance, Crosby   (2004)   found  evidence  of   ‘opinion  
shopping’ – borrowers obtaining preliminary indications of value from a range of values before 
formal instruction to appraise. The client is consulted at various stages throughout the DVA process.  
It seems that this is centred on updating but also obtaining input from the client about which policy 
targets should be analysed; affordable housing target and tenure mix, infrastructure costs, etc.   In the 
early part of the DVA process, one respondent felt that they were not being commissioned because it 
was anticipated by the client that they would not  provide  the  ‘desired’  output:     
 
There have been one or two authorities where we have pitched for the job and I think they 
have seen the work we have carried out where clearly that was not the output that they 
wanted  and  we  haven’t  been  successful  in  those  commissions,  because  they  kind  of know 
what answer they are going to get.  
Respondent 03 
 
However, this was the only respondent to note this point and it was far more commonly stated that 
price was the key determinant of appointment.  After agreeing terms of engagement, interviewees 
described a range of experiences in terms of the level of feedback from the client.  Whilst some 
required regular updates and consultation, others tended to be less engaged: 
 
So you get your commission and then some local authorities will let you plough on on 
your own and some will require fortnightly reports and God knows what monitoring. So 
we have had a variety of different types of models. 
Respondent 11 
 
We  have   the   inception  meeting,  we   then  go  away   for  a   few  weeks…we  would  probably  
then go back to the local  authority,  have  a  meeting,  sit  down  with  them  and  say  ‘look,  at  
the  early  stages  it’s  looking  as  if…  Now,  what  do  you  want  us  to  do?’...So there is a bit of 
feedback at that point. 
Respondent 06 
 
While the format of feedback varied, providing the client with a draft of the final report for comment 
was the standard practice. This was the main opportunity for overt influence. However, there was also 
opportunity to incorporate client feedback before a draft was produced. Whilst not all appraisers had 
such discussions, this would typically involve some type of verbal presentation and discussion with 
planning officers and members of the planning committee. As a participant explained: 
 
Yes,  that’s  standard  process.  I  prefer  to  make  sure  that we can have an opportunity to 
discuss the key results before we start drafting.  
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Interviewer: Because?  
Because what you need to do is to have a dialogue about what the implications are of 
these   results   and  also   because   if   there’s   an   issue   that   you’ve   thrown up you want to 
discuss with them, you may need to go back and adjust your modelling, add modelling 
in, do something different, look at some different aspects.  So  I’m  very  reluctant  to  go  
straight in and write a draft report. 
Respondent 04 
 
What is interesting to note here is that the appraiser (consultant) is in control of the decision about 
whether or not to consult clients, as well as the form that this consultation should take. Theirs is a 
pragmatic reasoning about the (dis)benefits of engagement that reflects their relatively high levels of 
autonomy over the DVA process, rather than being a result of (Kinnard et al, 1997; Worzala, 1998; 
Yu, 2002). This was borne out by other interview responses that described how consultants interacted 
with clients.  For example: 
 
Yeah,  it  will  go  to  them  and  then  we’ll  go  and  meet  them  to  talk  about  it.  We  will  often  
have several meetings with officers, senior officers, to talk them through and then often 
we go and see the members as well to explain to them what the results are and what 
they   mean.   So,   on   that   exercise   it’s   really   distilling   down   what   we’ve   got   into   key  
headlines and just taking out small samples of data that represent the whole of the 
general  picture  to  illustrate  the  points  because  you  can’t  possibly expect people to go 
through reams of data. 
Respondent 10 
 
 
Whilst not made explicit here, it seems implicit that the appraisers are testing the acceptability of their 
findings before submitting a report.  A similar motive is possible for submitting a draft report – albeit 
there is also a quality assurance function, reflecting McAllister et al’s  (2004)  findings: 
 
We will then produce a draft report for them, that will be circulated within the local 
authority probably solely to officers at that point, but they will advise as to whether the 
recommendations, the reasoning, the methodology are sufficiently clear, for them to be 
able to present it to members.  So coming out of the draft there might be some 
amendments to make, largely for clarification purposes, before we submit the final report 
to them, and the submission process of the final report will either be; just send it up to 
them, or take it to them and sit down with them, or some of the members just to be able to 
take them through it rather than dumping it on them. 
Respondent 06 
 
We report to the client initially and we will produce a draft report and then before we 
issue that as a final report we will circulate that to stakeholders, typically have a further 
workshop  and  say  ‘these  are  the  findings,  here is the report, you have a period of time in 
which  to  raise  any  comments’. 
Respondent 03 
 
Reports were amended at the draft stage.  However, the evidence from the respondents suggests that 
changes tended to be relatively minor.  Consistent with previous research on other types of appraisals, 
respondents suggested that clients would provide useful information to improve the quality of the 
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appraisal process. This could involve requests for further detail and clarification, identification of 
errors and provision of additional information: 
 
Very often you find they are giving you anecdotal information after the draft report which 
really they could usefully have given you at the beginning, that kind of thing.  Most often 
there’s  bit  of  information  they  wanted  or  analysis  they  wanted  that  you  didn’t  put  in  that  
they  want,  fair  enough  that’s  what  a  drafts  about.    That’s  the  way  it  works.   
Respondent 07 
 
They often have a panel of people and they go through it with a fine toothcomb and then 
we  discuss  the  changes  with  them…  I  write  to  the  person  who  is  doing  it  ‘I  agree  with  this  
point,  I  don’t  agree  with  this,  you  have  misunderstood  what  this  point  means’.  So  there  is  
a discussion. 
Respondent 01 
 
Turning again here to the issue of client pressure, in previous survey-based research on client 
influence on appraisals, a number of studies found that appraisers believed that other appraisers would 
respond to client pressure.  Whilst this was not a recurring theme in this study, one respondent stated: 
 
I’m  working  for  myself.    I  don’t  mind  saying  ‘I  don’t  want  the  money  and  walking  away’.  
If you are running a big company like [deleted] or something and you are a partner 
there, you have mouths to feed. You have your staff to keep going. It is a more difficult 
ethical  decision   to  walk  away   from  a  piece  of  work.  Now  I  can  do   it  because  I’m  solo.  
That’s   part   of   the   reason   I   am   solo.      I   know   [deleted]   certainly   didn’t  mind   changing  
reports because the client fancied a better-looking  result.  They’ve  asked  me  to  do  it   for  
them, but you know.   
Respondent 07 
 
However, other respondents did not confirm this.  The interview results instead suggested that there 
was very little attempt to influence the appraisal outputs and conclusions at the draft report stage, 
reinforcing the sense that appraisers are relatively autonomous actors. While appraisers were aware 
that their findings did sometimes cause some problems, overall there was a consistent response that 
appraisers (personally) would resist pressure from clients to alter their findings:  
 
I’m  quite  robust.  There  are  two  answers  - my answer and the wrong one.  They pay me 
for  advice  as  far  as  I  am  concerned,  and  I  don’t  change  the  advice  because  they  find  it  
inconvenient.    That  isn’t  universal practice in the business. 
Respondent 01 
 
Interviewer: Do you ever get the impression that you have given them the wrong answer?   
Yes it does happen, but if that is what the evidence shows, you just have to present it. 
Respondent 06 
 
We  don’t  change  everything   just  because   they  think…  I  say  ‘this   is  my  report  to  you,   if  
you  don’t   like   it   you  do  something  else  with   it.   I  am  not  prepared   to  change   things  we  
have  actually  found.  If  you  don’t  like  what  we  have  found,  that  is  a  problem  for  you,  not  
for us’. 
Respondent 07 
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We  are  fiercely  independent.  We  say  ‘we  will  tell  you  what  the  answer  is,  what  the  results  
of   the   analysis   are   and   just   because   you   don’t   like   the   answer   doesn’t   mean   we   will  
change them.  You can choose to ignore them in your policy making.  That’s  your  area  not  
ours but we are not going to give you the answers that you want because those would suit 
you.’ 
Respondent 03 
 
 
Here appraisers are acting in line with RICs guidance that stresses the importance of consultants 
maintaining an objective and unbiased approach. This is also likely to part of a wider process of self-
regulation whereby consultants sough to protect their reputational capital as impartial experts, an 
important factor in securing future work.  
 
Modes of stakeholder engagement 
 
One way in which appraisers sought to balance the positive and negative effects of client influence, 
and demonstrate outwardly that they were acting in an objective and balanced way, was by overseeing 
levels and modes of stakeholder input. While the format that this took was varied, our research shows 
that consultation  with  ‘stakeholders’  was nonetheless a standard part of the process: 
 
And the other key part of it once we get appointed is the consultation element of it, the 
stakeholder consultation element, sorry jumping ahead.  We major on that as a key part 
of what we do.   
Respondent 03 
 
As discussed earlier in the paper, in recent decades the planning system has introduced a range of 
measures attempting to   place   stakeholders’   knowledge,   ideas   and   interests   at   the   centre   of   policy  
formation.   However, there remains a range of challenges associated with consultation, participation 
or engagement processes, and, relatedly, in reaching equitable and transparent development decisions.  
This is certainly the case in DVA, where stakeholders’  views  are  rarely  such  that  full  consensus  can  
be reached. Moreover, and perhaps more fundamentally, different stakeholders can have varying 
levels of engagement in any consultation processes related to DVA. These issues were noted by our 
interviewees, who described a relatively informal process of consultation that involved engaging in a 
number of ways with different interest groups, including clients (local authorities), developers and 
landowners.  
 
Since the appraisal process is essentially an attempt to simulate the financial inflows and outflows in a 
development project, it is not surprising that local developers were almost universally consulted. 
Echoing Jakeman et al’s (2006) comments, developer’s input into the modelling process was seen as 
beneficial since their ‘close-to-market’ expertise could   ‘improve’   the   information   inputs   into   the  
DVA.  Other stakeholders consulted frequently included landowners and/or their representatives.  
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Typically, the representatives of the community gaining planning obligations – housing associations 
and infrastructure providers - were also present: 
 
Developers, RSLs, landowners, sometimes estate agents, the more kind of knowledgeable 
local estate agents who know the whole area.  Sometimes you can be completely swamped 
by local authority officers and sometimes we have also had members, portfolio heads of 
planning and housing to sit in there as well.  
Respondent 11 
 
House   builders,   housing   associations,   agents,   consultants,   major   landowners…and   the  
authority   themselves.      That’s   normally   the   point   at  which  we   say   to   the   authority   ‘are  
there other teams who  are  involved  in  this  sort  of  work?    It’s  not  just  you  in  planning,  you  
need  to  get  their  input  at  this  stage  as  well’.     You  will   find  then  that  asset  management  
and property teams will come. 
Respondent 03 
 
I would normally speak to local developers, I am much less interested in talking to local 
agents  and  planning  consultants  who  bullshit   for  England,   I  get   fed  up  with   them.      It’s  
amazing how many planning consultants you get turning up to viability studies and 
making  (comments)  ‘how  can  you  say  this  land is only worth £500k, fella up the road sold 
his   for   £1.5m   per   ha’   – well   that’s   a   different   site,   a   different   place,   different  
characteristics and a different time – but  they  don’t  buy  that.   
Respondent 01 
 
It is also important to note those who were not consulted.  Perhaps most critically, given the central 
role  that  DVAs  can  play  in  determining  developer  contributions  in  relation  to  public  ‘goods’  such  as  
affordable housing, none of the interviewees consulted members of the local community beyond 
representative groups such as RSLs (as described above). While widening consultation processes to 
integrate formal consultation with residents as part of the gaining of planning consent has long been a 
goal embedded within the town planning system, as yet, this has not extended to the DVA process, 
despite recent media coverage suggesting that the appraisal process should be open to public scrutiny 
(see Mathiason et al, 2013). 
 
The method of consultation described by interviewees varied, but was overseen and orchestrated by 
the consultant, reinforcing their relatively autonomous role. Most interviewees explained that they 
preferred to meet stakeholders collectively, although this was not uniformly the case.  One 
interviewee felt that individual face-to-face meetings were more productive given how contested the 
appraisal process could become.  In other cases, a single meeting with all stakeholders together would 
take place.  Other appraisers preferred to meet different groups separately as they felt that this 
enhanced the likelihood of some kind of consensus being reached: 
 
We interview individually because we have found that planners, housing people and 
developers   in   the   same   room   just   start   to  argue.     They  won’t  agree  anything…the  best  
way to get the best out of them was to separate them. We had half days with developers, 
half days with planning lawyers, half days with environmentalists, half days with 
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consumers. But we knew if you put them together, there would be no consensus in any 
shape or form.   
Respondent 07 
 
 Overall, there was little consistency in the methods of engagement employed, and the approach could 
vary according to local authority, and their levels of knowledge of, and experience of commissioning, 
appraisals: 
 
It varies. Also it depends on what the local authority already has as its network and how 
well  it’s  tuned  in  because  if  it’s  very  well tuned, it might have some standing forum that it 
uses. You go along and talk to them or you write to them and get feedback or you have to 
work with the authority to identify the right people to go to, try and help to boost 
numbers…They vary enormously in size as well as to whether you get a big turnout, small 
turnout but face to face contact through a workshop is very useful. 
Respondent 04 
 
 
While modes of engagement varied, two main motives for stakeholder consultation were identified.  
The first, reflecting the motivations cited in the modelling literature, was related to improving the 
appraisal.  Stakeholders were perceived as important sources of local market information that 
provided key inputs into the appraisal process: 
 
We agree density arrangements. We agree size of property to be built.  So we talk to the 
developers about their assumptions, what they are trying to get in terms of profit, time 
period. We set assumptions about how quickly we can get on and off the site.  We try to 
look at all the key variables that are going to affect that end result - the residual land 
value.  We talk to the DV in the local areas, because obviously they are picking up data.   
Respondent 07 
 
Whilst we will have our own ideas about what we think are appropriate site sizes or 
property values or whatever, the important part of it is to engage all the stakeholders in 
agreeing those assumptions because they are a key part of the exercise. 
Respondent 03 
 
Yes, we tend to involve house builders in putting together the information.  I have one at 
the moment where we literally did a questionnaire which was sent out to 20 house 
builders operating in the area and the purpose of that was to establish the sorts of inputs 
that would go into the appraisals.  So I am talking about, typically, build costs for 
different  types  of  project,  fee  levels,  finance  levels,  profit  levels  that  sort  of  thing… 
Respondent 06 
 
You will have discussions about unit size, unit size in the district, what are the typical 
sales values in different locations? What are the sales rates? How quickly are houses 
selling? What are average build costs in the area at the moment?   
Respondent 11 
 
The second motive was broadly related to legitimisation of the appraisal outputs. Here the links to the 
planning theory literature, which acknowledges the contested nature of development and the 
challenges involved in reaching consensus, are evident. The consultation was, however, less about 
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creating an ideal speech situation in which to broker consensus, and rather about conveying to 
stakeholders the very contestability of the inputs. Interviewees also spoke of creating a scenario in 
which to defuse opposition and generate support for the appraisal outputs by involving interested 
parties in their formulation: 
 
So just trying to hedge off some of those adverse responses that might come in. At least 
we  can  say  ‘you  all   told  us   that  your  build  costs  were  £110,  your  profit   levels  are   this,  
your finance levels are that’.   So we involve them typically to that extent.  
Respondent 06 
 
A  commonly  used  phrase  was  that  of  ‘buy-in’  or  as  one  interviewee  put  it:   
 
It’s   the  key  part  because  what  you  are  doing   is  getting  buy-in from everybody so when 
you   actually   then   produce   the   results   you   can   say   ‘well   it’s   based   on   the   assumptions  
which   we   all   agreed,   isn’t   it?’  So, if the methodology is agreed and the inputs are 
agreed,  you  can’t  really  argue  with  the  output.   
Respondent 03 
 
Another interviewee concurred, suggesting consultation was the: 
 
…sensible   thing   to   do   because   essentially   you’re   getting   buy-in from the development 
community and from the landowners, to a lesser extent I guess, in the variables that 
you’re  going  to  be  using  to  test  viability.  So,  to  be  able  to  say  to  an  inspector  at  an  EIP 
[Examination in Public] ‘These   developers   came   to   a  meeting  where  we   discussed   the  
variables, the inputs to the appraisal. They agreed them or they disagreed and we sought 
to  use  them  for  whatever  reason  it  might  be’  has  a  great  deal  of  value  because  you  can  
use that exercise to neutralise opposition.  
Respondent 10 
 
…one  of  the  tests  of  soundness  when  it  goes  in  front  of  the  Planning  Inspector  is  if  these  
sorts of views have been taken into account and how we have dealt with the views. 
Respondent 04 
 
The point made here about the EIP, refers to a widely held view; that consultation was important in 
demonstrating   ‘due   process’   had been followed. This is particularly pertinent since DVA is a 
relatively immature practice that has only been a formal focus of the town planning system for around 
10 years.  As such, DVA, and the techniques used to regulate and improve it (as described above), 
should be seen in this context. At present, the  ‘rules’  of  what  ‘due process’  in  DVA  consist  of have 
not been formally codified, beyond the guidance offered by organisations such as the RICs. They are, 
in  essence  ‘up  for  grabs’.  Our  research  shows  that,   in   the  absence  of  formalised  procedure  or   rules, 
appraisers are defining what good practice consists of, as well as how it should be adhered to. 
Interviews were of the view that, in a maturing area of practice, consultation was a key part of doing 
DVAs  ‘well’  for  several  reasons.  First,  engaging  a  range  of  stakeholders  means  that  better  information  
could be plugged into models, with the result that model outputs were likely to be more accurate. This 
relates to the second reason to engage; circumventing (or at least managing) issues of challengeability 
and   contestability,   essentially   achieving   ‘buy-in’.   Third, consultation could help by upholding 
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standards of acceptable professional conduct, and preserving (individual) reputations  of  ‘impartiality’,  
in particular. Finally, there was also a sense amongst participants that consultation was simply a  ‘good  
thing’. This brings motivations for consultation more into line with the social justice/equity arguments 
put forward in the planning theory literature, although we note that those communities being affected 
by development decisions currently sit outside of stakeholder engagement in DVA. 
 
Conclusions 
 
In the English planning system, over the last decade financial appraisals of actual and potential 
development projects have become more central to policy formation.  In particular, they have become 
critical to the distribution of the financial gains from permission to develop between the community 
and landowners.  Typical of those practices defined  as  ‘calculative’, development viability modelling 
can appear to transform the varied and multifaceted processes associated with development decisions 
into relatively straightforward, objective, quantitative, technical and quasi-scientific procedures.  
Existing literature (see, for example, Crosby et al, 2013 and McAllister and Wyatt, 2013) argues that 
any implied objectivity may be largely illusory: choices of many model assumptions are critical, are 
not neutral and impartial, are subject to interpretation and bias and, ultimately can have major effects 
on outcomes in terms of the distribution of resources.   
 
The focus of this paper has been on the extent to which participants – clients and other stakeholders – 
in the production of DVAs have the means, motives and opportunity to bias the outcomes of the 
modelling process.  It is well established in the academic literature that clients can influence the 
outputs of information intermediaries such as auditors, equity analysts and real estate appraisers.  
However, there can be a complex range of incentives and counterincentives in either responding to or 
applying such pressure.  Further, it is recognised that client influence can be beneficial by, in 
particular, providing a constructive quality assurance function.   
 
Our empirical research reveals a broadly positive picture of the role of client influence in the 
formation of development viability appraisals.  Where it occurs, the majority of client influence on 
development viability appraisals seems to be beneficial.  Producers of development viability 
appraisers seem to be jealous of their independence.  However, it is likely that this independence is 
rarely challenged by clients since they seldom possess the technical knowledge to contest the 
approaches to and assumptions of the viability modelling processes.   In addition, there is infrequently 
any personal economic incentive for clients to attempt to bias the outputs of such models. 
 
Stakeholder engagement is increasingly seen as a key element of an inclusive approach to planning.   
It can interpreted as part of a long term shift within planning that is attempting  to  place  stakeholders’  
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knowledge, ideas and interests rather than professionals at the centre of policy formation.   However, 
there a wide range of challenges associated with consultation, participation or engagement processes.  
In particular, the outcome of consultation is rarely, if ever, a fully inclusive consensus (see Mouffe, 
2005). This is, in part, because different stakeholders can have differing (or no) access to a 
consultation process; our research evidences this, showing a lack of local community input to DVA. 
 
The interview study indicated that the participation of and consultation with local market actors and, 
to a far lesser extent, community stakeholders (represented through arms-length groups such as RSLs) 
was seen as an important element of the viability modelling process.  Two key reasons for this 
emerged.  Similar to clients, local stakeholders were able to contribute valuable local knowledge to 
the information intensive process of simulating the financial flows created by a proposed 
development.  This was perceived to improve the robustness of the modelling process.  In addition, 
the inclusion of a range of stakeholders with often conflicting interests e.g. affordable housing 
providers and land owners, often highlighted the intrinsic uncertainties associated with the 
assumptions of the modelling process.  This, in turn, served a legitimisation function neutralising 
opposition  and  increasing  stakeholder  ‘buy-in’  to  the  process. 
 
There is a disjuncture between the still emergent nature of DVA, characterised by an immature but far 
from dysfunctional set of (self) regulatory practices, and the importance being placed upon it as a 
(now) central component of the town planning system. Understanding of the workings of DVA – the 
things that work well and those that do not – is not keeping pace with the ascendance of viability up 
the policy agenda. While our research shows that appraisers are putting in place a range of steps, in 
line with soft industry-produced  guidance,  to  ensure  ‘good  practice’  is  adhered to, planners are often, 
in part because of the skills and knowledge gap issues described in the paper, outside of, or on the 
periphery of decision-making. 
 
Whilst becoming increasingly established, the use of DVA in the English planning system can still be 
characterised as emergent and evolving.  The limited research to date has focussed on the use of 
DVAs in the formation of broad, area-wide policy formation regarding planning obligations.  Whilst 
resultant policies  will  create  benchmarks  or  ‘anchors’ for individual projects, the use of DVA at the 
scale of individual development schemes can be much more controversial.  For actual projects where 
the expected costs and revenues are much more defined and the gains and losses to the developer 
and/or landowner in the negotiation process can represent corresponding losses and gains to the local 
community, there is anecdotal evidence to suggest a much more contested and controversial approach 
to the formation of viability models.  These project-specific models are more likely to be confidential, 
commercially sensitive, politically contentious and, consequently, likely to be challenged.  Further 
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research should help determine whether, at the project scale, independence and consultation in the 
production of financial viability models tends to be compromised.  
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Appendix 1 
 
Development viability 
appraisals appear to vary 
in appearance, purpose 
and scope.  Would you be 
able to tell us more about 
the  ‘standard’  
commissioning/instruction 
process in relation to 
DVA studies? 
 
Would you be able 
to briefly describe 
your current 
role/background 
and the nature of 
the development 
appraisal work you 
are involved with? 
Would you be 
able to tell us a 
little more about 
how you are 
briefed by your 
client in relation 
to a DVA study? 
What are your key 
data/information 
sources? 
Do you produce 
DVA appraisals 
based on third 
party software or 
bespoke self-built 
models?   
In terms of the inputs and 
assumptions that go into a 
DVA, for each of the 
following inputs we 
would be interested in 
how you determine them 
and how you decide on 
the level of detail to go 
into the various 
assumptions? (key inputs 
listed) 
 
What is the output 
of the development 
viability appraisal 
method you use? 
If the output was 
RLV, was an 
assumption made 
about the 
Threshold Land 
Value? If so, was 
it MV assuming 
current use, MV 
assuming likely 
planning 
permission or 
something else? 
 
Do you undertake 
any risk analysis? 
What benchmarks 
do you use? 
How are results reported 
to clients? And how are 
these validated? 
 
Do you feel that 
clients appreciate 
the  ‘snapshot’  
nature of a DVA? 
And likewise 
appreciate the 
uncertainties in a 
DVA? 
 
Do you feel DVA 
is fit for purpose? 
Do you have any 
suggestions for 
improving 
DVAs? 
Is there anyone 
else currently 
operating in this 
field that you feel 
we should 
interview?  We are 
also looking for 
‘pairs’  of  DVAs  – 
for example from 
public inquiries – 
do you have any 
we would be able 
to access at a later 
stage? 
Are there any 
final comments 
you would like to 
make in relation 
to DVA? 
 
